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Abstract
Recent macroeconomic events have reinvigorated research in financial crises,
namely systemic banking crises. While theoretical and empirical research on the
causes and leading indicator of banking crises is vast, empirical literature on the cost
of such crises is sparse. This paper addresses that void in the literature. Utilizing
a new database compiled by the IMF on financial sector reforms, the correlation
between financial sector liberalization and the severity of systemic banking crises is
examined. The aspect of financial sector liberalization with the strongest correlation
with the severity of systemic banking crises is the level of banking supervision and
prudent regulation. It is found that higher levels of banking supervision is negatively
correlated with output losses due to the banking crisis. Weaker evidence is found
for the aspects relating to credit controls, entry barriers, privatization, and security
markets. Additionally, reforms are not shown to be significantly correlated with more
or less severe banking crises. Results are robust to changes in assumptions made
during the calculation of the output loss figures.
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Chapter 1
Financial Liberalization and the
Severity of Systemic Banking
Crises
1.1 Introduction
In an expansive study of financial crises over the two preceding centuries,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) observe that “since the early 1970s, financial and inter-
national capital account liberalization took root worldwide. So, too, have banking
crises.” From 1950 to 1973, the percentage of countries experiencing a banking crisis
remained close zero percent (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).1 Over the following four
decades, the percentage of countries experiencing a banking crises increased dramat-
ically. At one point in the 1990s, that percentage reached as high as 30 percent. As
the global financial system appeared to regain its composure, the first global financial
crisis of the 21st century explodes into the forefront of political and international
1Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) report the percentage weighted by their share of world income.
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macroeconomic concerns, and with it, an influx of research on the causes and conse-
quences of systemic banking crises.
Systemic banking crises can have disastrous consequences on the macroecon-
omy as episodes are often associated with stark declines in economic activity. As
explained by Haugh et al. (2009), output losses are greater for recessions following
banking crises than for recessions not following banking crises. Additionally, the
half:life of the maximum output gap is greater in recessions following banking crises.
This result implies that economic contraction following banking crises are not only
deeper but of longer duration. Beyond persistent output losses, systemic banking
crises are associated with periods depressed asset prices, high levels of unemploy-
ment, sharp increases in the real interest rate, and significant slowdown or reversal
of financial capital inflows (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
note that banking crises are not a concern for just the less developed countries. They
find that while industrialized countries have seemed to have graduated from inflation,
currency, and until recently, sovereign debt crises, they have not been able to escape
the grasp of banking crises. As a result, the factors relating to the consequences of
banking crises remain a source for further exploration.
This paper builds upon the observation that banking crises tend to follow pe-
riods of financial liberalization. Hence, the correlation between the pre:crisis level of
financial liberalization and the severity of systemic banking crises is examined. The
measure of financial liberalization, as developed by Abiad et al. (2008), is disaggre-
gated into its seven components to determine which of the policy aspect variables
are correlated with the measured output loss during the crises.2 To test this correla-
tion, a measure of output loss must be derived for each of the crises occurring from
2The seven components are credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, banking su-
pervision, privatization, international capital restrictions, and security markets. The measures is
discussed further in the data section of the paper.
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1973 to 2005, a task that is made more difficult by the lack of a consensus on the
preferred methodology. To account for this lack of consensus, various measures are
created. Each measures alters the assumption on the desired window of time utilized
to calculate the pre:crisis trend. Weak evidence is found that liberalization of the
credit controls, entry barriers, privatization, and security market development are
correlated with greater output losses. When allowing for changes in the overall mea-
sure of financial liberalization, it is found that reversals, a downward adjustment of
the financial liberalization measure, are correlated with greater output losses. While
this is an interesting result, another important result is that reforms in the country’s
financial sector does not show to have any significant impact on the severity of the
banking crises. The most compelling evidence relates to the policy aspect relating
to banking supervision and prudent regulation. Across all measures of output loss,
banking supervision and prudent regulation is negatively related to output loss, and
when interacted with the remaining six policy variables, banking supervision lowers
the impact that liberalizing has on the measured output loss.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides an overview of the root
causes of banking crises. Section III reviews the related literature and highlights the
void that this project fills. Section IV provides details on the creation of the output
loss variable and the data utilized. Section V describes the empirical models that will
be estimated. Section VI discusses the estimation and results. Section VI provides
concluding remarks.
1.2 Banking Crises: An Overview
Financial instruments, markets, and institutions develop to minimize informa-
tion and transactions costs associated with matching lenders with borrowers. With an
3
underdeveloped financial system, savers desiring to lend must find a debtor willing to
borrow. This matching process requires a significant amount of time and cost. The
saver determines the rate that covers the costs incurred during the search process
and the opportunity cost of not having the funds at their disposal. The potential
borrower searches for a lender with a rate that is lower than the expected rate of
return on their investment project. As the financial system develops, savers are no
longer required to carry out the search process themselves. They deposit funds with
a financial institution whose comparative advantage lies in the collection and evalua-
tion of information, and that institution matches the funds with a firm or household
in need of external financing of their capital purchases (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991).
The existence and further development of financial intermediaries can increase saving
rates, and with better access to external financing, firms are able to acquire funding
to innovate and purchase capital goods. As the capital stock in the economy expands
and the level of total factor productivity rises, long:run growth is accelerated (Levine,
2004).
Savers deposit their funds with financial institutions under a belief that the
institution will return to them on demand the funds deposited plus a rate of interest.
Banking crises occur when depositors realize that the rate of return that they are
receiving does not sufficiently reward the amount of risk they are bearing and with-
draw their funds from the financial institution. When individual bank runs occur,
much concern does not arise, but when runs become systemic, the economy finds itself
in the midst of a crisis. To satisfy their depositors, banks must sell their assets to
obtain the funds to cover their demand deposits. Under a fractional reserve system
and the nature of the banking industry, banks are subject to maturity mismatch as
many illiquid long term assets are financed through short term debt(Bernanke et al.,
1996). Thus, selling the long:term assets is costly as the increased supply to the
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market lowers their price, and banks find it difficult to liquidate a sufficient amount
to cover the debt. As the bank becomes insolvent, it must turn to the government for
assistance. At this point, credit is constrained, asset prices are falling, real interest
rates are rising, investment is falling, and the economy is pushed into a recession
with unemployment rates rising by an average of seven percent (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009a).3 The government is faced with the decision whether to bail out the financial
institutions and how much it is willing to contribute toward saving insolvent banks.
When systemic banking crises arise, the financial system loses its ability to
facilitate the matching of savers and borrowers as the level of asymmetric informa-
tion rises. Prior to the occurrence of a banking crisis, the economy experiences a
prolonged period of credit growth (Laeven and Valencia, 2010), and leading into the
banking crisis, large imbalances in the balance sheet can be found in the private sec-
tor. This imbalance, whether caused by currency mismatch or exchange rate risk,
translates into credit risk for the financial intermediaries, and lending to finance large
capital expenditure declines. This channel through which a financial crisis leads to
a decline in real output is referred to as the “balance sheet” or “collateral” channel.
The second channel through which financial crises moves into the real sector is the
“bank lending” channel where a troubled banking sector tightens credit in the face of
liquidity constraints. When the firms are not able to smooth their liquidity shortfall
through borrowing from intermediaries, large contractionary impacts on real output
occurs (Bernanke, 1983). Both channels increase the financial constraint that firms
and households face, and in doing so, decreases the level of investment and output
growth throughout an economy (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010).
Banking crises can be extremely costly as illustrated in Reinhart and Rogoff
3Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) find that there is a decline in real housing prices of 35 percent from
peak to trough of approximately six years, and equity prices decline over an average of three and a
half years by 55 percent.
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(2009a). In their sample of banking crisis over the last century, they find that the
cumulative decline in real asset prices declines from peak to trough by approximately
35.5 percent and continues to decline for an average of six years following the onset of
the banking crisis. The drop in equity prices is more pronounced with an average of
55.9 percent, but the decline is over a shorter period of time than for the real estate
prices. On average, unemployment rises over a five year period by approximately
seven percentage points. Declines in output per capita lasts for two years on average
with an mean magnitude of 9.3 percent.4 Real government debt also rises following a
banking crisis. On the back of falling tax revenues and increased government spending
to attempt to stimulate the economy, government debt increased over 86 percent in
the three years following the banking crisis. Thus, banking crises can be detrimental
to an economy through falling output prices, falling per capita income, rising and
persistent unemployment that is present even after output per capita rebounds, and
increases government debt. In this paper, the loss in per capita output is examined
further. It serves as a link between the identification of the economic consequences of
a banking crises and one of the most often identified causes, financial liberalization.
1.3 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on the causes and consequences of banking crises is
vast, but the empirical work on the subject is far less comprehensive. Focusing on
both developed and developing countries, the empirical literature on systemic banking
crises largely focuses on determining the economic and financial variables associated
with the probability of a banking crisis occurring. A survey of the literature highlights
factors such as a weak macroeconomic environment, currency overvaluation, deposit
4Note: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) only examines absolute changes in income, not the percent
deviation from potential output.
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insurance, and financial liberalization.
In examining the factors that associated with the emergence of a systemic
banking crisis, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) find strong evidence that a
weak macroeconomic environment precedes banking crisis and increases the proba-
bility of a banking crisis occurring. A weak macroeconomic environment exhibits
low output growth and high inflation rates. In addition, high real interest rates are
associated with banking sector problems. Sudden capital outflows, a high share of
credit to the private sector, and high credit growth in the years prior to the crisis
are associated with a higher probability of a crisis. Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999)
identify variables that act as early warning signals for crises to be foreign exchange
reserves, high real interest rates, low output growth, and a decline in stock prices.
As the financial system is liberalized, banks have are able to borrow in foreign
currency and lend in the domestic currency. In cases of unexpected depreciation, bank
profitability is jeopardized because even if the banks are able to call the loans issued,
the value outstanding in domestic currency will not cover the foreign denominated
debt. With the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet declining against their liabilities,
the solvency of these banks comes into question. If the banks choose to project
the risk onto the borrowers in the domestic country, they would issue the domestic
debt denominated in foreign currency. While this removes direct exposure to the
exchange rate risk, bank profitability remains impacted as an unexpected devaluation
would increase the number of non:performing loans. Many researchers incorporate
the real exchange rate and the percent change in the real exchange rate. Reinhart
and Kaminsky (1999) find that currency devaluations precede banking crises and can
be used as an early warning sign. Others, such as Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
(1997) find that when controlling for output growth, inflation rates, and interest rates,
the rate of currency depreciation is not significant in determining the cause of banking
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crises.
Once depositors believe that the banking sector is troubled, many withdraw
their funds from the bank to avoid complete loss. If banks are able to meet the
demand of funds from the initial depositors, the bank will be able to signal their
health and stave off further bank runs. In times of crises, the government’s deposit
insurance acts as a guarantee to the depositors and can diminish the frequency and
volume of bank runs. Deposit insurance can decelerate the onset of insolvency. A
negative aspect of this guarantee is that it leads to moral hazard on the side of bank
managers as incentive is provided to take on excessive risk. Thus, the presences of a
government guarantee, explicit or implicit, makes moral hazard an even larger prob-
lem (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Oversight of the banking system can
minimize the moral hazard due to the guarantee. As a predictor, explicit deposit in-
surance is often highlighted as a factor that contributes to the probability of a banking
crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). An alternative solution to an implicit
guarantee is to allow depositors act as market disciplinarians (Peria and Schmukler,
2001). Allowing depositors act as bank monitors, banks taking on excessive risk are
penalized as depositors will demand higher interest rates. In their analysis, Peria and
Schmukler found that market discipline on the part of depositors, in both insured and
uninsured systems, declines during crises and increases sharply after the crisis ends.
Through a further examination of the determinants of banking crises, Reinhart
and Kaminsky (1999) create a a measure of financial liberalization through the ob-
servation of policy changes such as the bank interest rate deregulation in 53 countries
between 1980 and 1995. While controlling for the factors identified as determinants
of banking crisis in their previous work, Kaminsky and Reinhart investigate whether
banking crises are more likely to occur in countries with more liberalized financial
sectors. They find that periods of financial liberalization increases the probability
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of a banking crisis occurring, and the probability increases substantially in countries
with weak institutions where rule of law is weak, corruption is widespread, the bu-
reaucracy is inefficient, and contract enforcement mechanisms are ineffective. The
primary reason for financial sector fragility is the degree of moral hazard present
in the system. The aforementioned discussion on banking guarantees is one source,
but financial liberalization is another. Financial liberalization leads to the increased
fragility of the banking sector through the removal of interest rate ceilings and/or
the reduction of barriers to entry. Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999) also observe that
financial liberalization often precedes banking crises, and that banking crises ofter
precede currency crises. Prior to the liberalization of financial markets during the
1970s, no apparent link between banking and currency crises was found.
Research has shown that the movement to liberalize financial sectors has re-
sulted in short-run financial sector fragilities that could lead to banking crises. Glick
and Hutchison (1999) examines the causes of both banking and currency crises and
find that twin crises are more common in emerging markets who have liberalized their
financial sector, and similar to Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999), Glick and Hutchinson
claim that banking crises are predictors to currency crises. Additionally, Eichengreen
and Arteta (2000) propose that the leading causes to banking crises are lending booms,
precipitous financial liberalization, inadequate prudential supervision, and weaknesses
in the legal and institutional framework. The unsustainable lending boom arises when
macroeconomics and financial policies are combined with financial deregulation. As
the volume of lending rises, it becomes more difficult for the lending institutions to
sort through the information on each borrower. The issue of adverse selection arises,
and the quality of loans declines. Financial liberalization, through releasing con-
trols on the domestic interest rate, allows banks to compete for deposits and finances
the unstable lending, and the increased competition through the reduction of entry
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barriers encourages the risk taking behavior of the financial institutions.
Typically, measures such as real interest rates and interest rate controls, are
used to proxy for the level of financial liberalization. Employing the “New Database
of Financial Reforms”, Shehzad and de Haan (2009) find that most of the six dimen-
sions of financial liberalization captured in the measure conditional on the level of
banking supervision and prudential regulation decreases the probability of a banking
crisis occurring. Thus, it is when the financial sector is liberalized in the absence of
supervision and regulation that the risk of a banking crisis increases. This finding is
not that different than the work of Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999), but the financial
liberalization measure that is used by Shehzad and de Haan (2009) covers a wider
array of the elements of financial liberalization. Kaminsky and Reinhart created a
measure based upon observed policy movements in a country’s interest rate controls
while the measure used by Shehzad and Haan covers five additional aspects plus
prudential regulation and banking supervision.
A brief overview of the literature on financial liberalization and financial crises
brings to light a void in the empirical literature on systemic banking crises. The vast
majority of the work centers on the causes of the crises and leaves the discussion
of the severity as an afterthought. When discussing severity, papers normally use
their measure, typically output loss, as a means of comparing the depth of different
banking crises and comparing banking crises to other types of financial crises. There
is little work on the correlation between pre:crisis levels of financial liberalization and
output losses suffered during a banking crisis. This paper is related to the literature
in that it takes the aforementioned findings and poses the question of whether the
pre:crisis level of financial liberalization is associated with the severity, or output
loss, attributed to the banking crisis. This project further contributes to the existing
literature in that differing assumptions are utilized to form measures of output loss
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that will be used to test the sensitivity of the results.
1.4 Data
Historically, a systemic banking crisis is identified as a period in which a large
fraction of the banking system is depleted (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). In what
is traditionally thought of to be a fairly qualitative approach, Laeven and Valencia
extend their previous work and build upon that of previous research to develop a
specific criterion with the goal of identifying, in a quantitative fashion, the begin-
ning and end years of banking crises. According to their methodology, countries are
determined to have experienced a systemic banking crisis if (1) the banking system
shows significant signs of bank distress, and (2) significant losses in the banking sys-
tem have lead to significant policy intervention.5,6 The beginning year of the crisis
is the first year that meets both of the above criteria. The end year of the banking
crisis is determined to be the year prior to at least two consecutive years of positive
real credit and real GDP growth. Laeven and Valencia’s “Banking Crisis Database”
identifies 145 banking crises from 1970 to 2009. For this paper, the number of crisis
examined is reduced along with the sample period. The first reason for reducing the
number of crisis observed is that many of the crisis in Laeven and Valencia’s database
occur during the latest global banking crisis, and many of those crisis were ongoing
at the end of their sample. In addition to the aforementioned crises, any episode with
an end date after 2005 was omitted from the sample. Due to the availability of the
5Signs of financial distress are recorded bank runs, losses in the banking system, and bank
liquidations.
6Laeven and Valencia (2010) identify the existence of significant policy intervention if at least
three of the following six measures are observed: (1) extensive liquidity support, (2) bank restruc-
turing costs of at least three percent of GDP, (3) significant bank nationalizations or government
acquisition of a majority stake in financial institutions, (4) significant guarantees instituted, (5) asset
purchases of at least 5 percent of GDP, and (6) deposit freezes and bank holidays.
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measure(s) of financial liberalization, the period of time examined in this paper is
narrowed to 1973 to 2005. Taking in these limiting factors, the final set of banking
crises includes 69 crises in 54 countries. Table 1.1 provides a list of those countries
along with the start and end dates of their systemic banking crisis.
The measure of financial liberalization employed originates in “A New Database
of Financial Reforms” developed by Abiad et al. (2008). This financial reform database
provides a graded measure of financial liberalization covering the financial sector of
91 countries from 1973 to 2005. The key feature of this measure is that it provides
a broader sense of financial liberalization than previous efforts have produced as it is
composed from seven financial policy aspects instead of conventional proxies such as
the real interest rate. Using the real interest rate as a proxy is problematic as it mea-
sures only one aspect of financial liberalization and influenced by more changes than
just the desired financial policy changes (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998).
The overall measure of financial liberalization can disaggregated into its seven policy
dimensions: credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate
controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, capital account restric-
tions, regulation and supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policy.7
The financial system of each country is assigned a value from zero to three for each of
the seven aspects. For every category, with the exception of prudent regulation and
banking sector supervision, a zero represents complete repression, and a three rep-
resents the highest level of liberalization. For banking supervision and regulation, a
zero represents a system that exhibits very little regulation and/or supervision, where
as a three is assigned to economies in which their financial system has the highest
level of supervision and regulation. Prompted by preliminary investigation and find-
ings on the importance of banking supervision in the literature, the graded measure
7See appendix for detailed information on each policy dimension.
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of the banking supervision aspect is divided into four binary variables: Banking(0),
Banking(1), Banking(2), and Banking(3). Banking(0) is an indicator variable that
takes on a value of one if the level of supervision and regulation is a zero. Banking(1)
is an indicator variable that equals one when the banking supervision score is a one.
Banking(2) and Banking(3) are formed in a similar fashion. This approach allows for
differences in the level of banking supervision without enforcing a linear relationship
between the index values. In reaching a measure of the overall level of financial lib-
eralization, the score for each of the seven policy aspects is summed together. Thus,
the overall measure ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 21, where the
higher the score, the more liberalized the financial sector. Since the primary concern
is pre-crisis levels of financial liberalization, all values are from the year prior to the
beginning of the crisis.
In addition to the graded scores for the level of financial liberalization, the
database includes a set of indicator variables representing changes in the level of
financial liberalization. When the overall index increases by three or more points, the
movement is referred to as a large reform. When it increases by two or fewer points,
it is referred to as a reform. A negative movement of two or fewer points is called a
reversal. where as a decrease of three or more points is referred to as a large reversal.
If it remains constants, the authors call this non:movement the “status quo”. As
shown by Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998),
and Angkinand et al. (2010) amongst others, economies are more susceptible to a
banking crisis following a period of liberalization of the financial sector. In fact, 59
percent of the crises followed either a reform or large reform. Consequently, a set of
variables is created to test whether a change in the level of financial liberalization is
correlated with output loss. The indicator variable “reform in two” takes on a value
of one if a reform occurred during the two years prior to the crisis. the variables “large
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reform in two”, “reversal in two”, “large reversal in two”, and “status quo in two” are
formed in a similar fashion. In addition to the measure(s) of financial liberalization
and indicators for changes in liberalization, the provided indicators for geographical
region are utilized.
Generally, the severity of a banking crisis is determined through an examina-
tion of the output lost over the duration of an episode. Output loss is defined the
cumulative percent deviation of actual from potential output over the length of the
crisis.8 While it is widely used in the literature as an acceptable means of determining
the severity of the financial crisis, the methodology for calculating the statistic re-
mains a topic of debate.9 The source of the disagreement lies with assumptions made
in order to calculate the output loss. The first assumption concerns the formation of
the pre-crisis trend. Logically, for the trend to represent potential output, it should
represent the growth path of the economy if the banking crisis had not occurred.
Thus, the issue arises when determining the number of years prior to the beginning
of the crisis used to form the trend of potential output. A consensus on the length of
time to utilize is debated in the literature. Laeven and Valencia (2010) use a twenty
year period prior to the crisis to estimate the pre-crisis trend. In their calculation,
Hoggarth et al. (2002) examine the measure using both three and ten year windows
prior to the crisis. Even though Bordo et al. (2001) focuses on output growth rates
instead of levels, they calculated their pre-crisis growth trend using the five years
prior to the start of the crisis. In this project, three different periods are used to
calculate potential output: a five year window, 20 year window, and imputing the
8Duration of the crisis is determined by Laeven and Valencia (2010)
9Research such as Hoggarth et al. (2002), Laeven and Valencia (2010), and Eichengreen and
Bordo (2002) use output loss as their measure of severity. Much of the literature utilizing output
loss focuses on the comparison of the severity of banking crises over time or against other types of
financial crises (currency and sovereign debt crises) as in Kapp and Vega (2012).
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trend directly from the moving average smoothed series of per capita output.10
The second assumption of concern is the appropriate post:crisis window that
the researcher sums across. The difficulty arises from the fact that downturns ac-
companying the crisis can impact many economic variables with varying degree and
persistence with per capita output being one with the shortest duration (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2009a). As noted by John H. Boyd and Smith (2005), ending the period when
output regains a positive growth rate underestimates the real cost of banking crises.
If the determination of the end of the crisis is when per capita real GDP returns to its
pre-crisis level, it ignores the opportunity cost associated with the depressed output
during the crisis. For consistency, the criterion set by Laeven and Valencia (2010) for
determining the end of the banking crisis is utilized in this paper.11
In forming the output loss measure utilized, the logged per capita real GDP
series is smoothed using the Hodrick:Prescott (HP) Filter from the beginning of the
sample to the year prior to the start of the crisis, t− 1, as illustrated for Finland in
Figure 1.12,13 In that figure, the solid line is LN per capita real GDP over the sample,
and the red line marked with the small x’s shows the smoothed Hodrick-Prescott
series for the variable. The advantage to using a moving average filter is that it
10Two additional measures of output loss are provided when discussing the robustness of results.
Both of these measures moves the window back one year to t − 2. The reason for this alternation
is that it is believed and some have shown Hoggarth et al. (2002) that banking crises are preceded
by credit booms. If the credit boom is large enough, the estimated trend of potential output can be
biased upward, and thus, overstate the loss Kapp and Vega (2012). It is also likely that recession
can begin prior to the dating of the crisis. In this case, inclusion of the year t : 1 could bias the trend
downward and understate the losses. Therefore the two additional measures created are projections
across the period [t− 6, t− 2] and [t− 20, t− 2]. Table 1.3 provides the complete set of output loss
figures.
11The end of a crisis is determined to be the year prior to real GDP growth and real credit growth
are positive for at least two consecutive years. In a number of cases this methodology long crisis
durations results, which sometimes is the consequence of additional shocks affecting the country’s
economic performance. In order to keep their identification process tractable, they truncate duration
at 5 years.
12The smoothing parameter of the HP Filter is λ = 100.
13Data on per capita real GDP extends backwards until 1960 for most countries
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minimizes the impact of the fluctuations in the business cycle. It is at this point
that a divergence in philosophy arises. Typically, a linear trend is calculated from
the filtered series over a pre:determined set of years prior to the crisis to form the
potential output trend. As mentioned, three different pre-crisis trends are created.
Figure 2 illustrates the three trends created for Finland whose crisis started in 1991
and ended in 1995. The first trend is based upon the five years prior to the start of the
crisis and is shown as the red line marked with x’s.14 For this first measure, it can be
argued that five years is an insufficient length of time to determine potential output.
It is possible that growth over that window of time is above the actual growth rate of
potential output, and thus, the potential trend calculated would overstate the actual
potential output and overstate losses. To address this concern, the length of the time
frame used to determine the trend is extended to obtain the second measure of output
loss. This measure lengthens the window from five years to 20 years. In the second
figure, the green line with squares represents this trend. The final measure imputes
the trend directly from the HP filtered series itself. This method does not have a
uniform window across crises as the imputed values are based upon data from the
beginning of the series until the year prior to the crisis. The advantage to this method
is that it utilizes all of the data points available to form the pre-crisis trend. The dark
orange line with circles in Figure 2 is the trend line based upon the Hodrick-Prescott
series to the period before the crisis.
After the estimates for potential output are calculated, annual output loss is
calculated as the percent deviation of actual output to potential output. To reach
a final figure, the annual output loss is summed across the duration of the banking
crisis. As is common in the literature, output loss is censored at zero and losses are
14The usage of the five years prior to the crisis or event follows in line with research by Eichengreen
and Bordo (2002) and Barro (2001).
16
stated in absolute value. Thus, a country who experienced an output gain during the
crisis shows in the data as a zero. Output loss values for the three measures can be
found in Table 1.2. Through examination of the different measures of output loss,
it is evident that the values can differ dramatically depending on the assumption on
the number of years it takes to form the pre-crisis trend. For Finland, the output loss
for the first measure is 34.62 percent, 80.12 percent for the measure based upon the
[t− 20, t− 1] trend, and 139.09 percent for the measure derived from the HP imputed
trend. Across the entire sample of 69 episodes, the average output loss under the first
measure is 10.44 percent with a standard deviation of 14.1 percent. The average
output loss under the second measure is 26.34 percent with a standard deviation
of 33.61 percent, and for the last measure, the average output loss is 45.06 percent
with a standard deviation of 53.48 percent. Finland is not unique in that the largest
measured output loss is derived from the series imputed directly from the Hodrick
Prescott series as nearly 73 percent of the countries in the sample have the largest
percent deviation through this measure.
With past and current literature focusing on the determinants of banking cri-
sis, many of the macroeconomic variables shown to be correlated with the occurrence
of a banking crises are identified. Given the list of contributing factors to banking
crisis, many of the identified variables are used as controls for the macroeconomic
environment within the country. The variables per capita real GDP, exchange rate,
fraction of output devoted to domestic consumption, government spending and in-
vestment are from the Penn World Table 7.0.15 All control variables correspond to
the year prior to the beginning of the banking crisis. The growth rate of real per
capita GDP is the growth rate of the year prior to the beginning of the crisis. The
15Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,
May 2011.
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percent change in the exchange rate is calculated over the period [t− 2, t− 1]. The
current account:to:GDP ratio is computed using the fraction of domestic absorption
provided in the Penn World Table. The inflation rate is pulled from the World Eco-
nomic Outlook Database 2003.16 The interest rate is included because the crisis is
likely to be associated with high nominal interest rates. Lastly, the variable “Previous
Crisis” takes on a value of one if a banking crisis occurs prior to that crisis in the
country. Table 1.4 provides selected descriptive statistics.
1.5 Empirical Models
The empirical models utilized are designed to test for the potential linkages
between financial sector liberalization and output losses sustained during a systemic
banking crisis. The examination of this correlation is approached on two fronts.
The first is concerned with the levels of financial liberalization. Specifically, is the
pre-crisis level of financial liberalization associated with banking crises of greater or
lesser severity? The second front incorporates the research on changes in the level
of financial liberalization. Thus, the research question becomes are banking crises
that follow changes in the level of financial liberalization associated with increased or
decreased levels of output loss?
1.5.1 Pre-crisis levels of financial liberalization
The first model focuses on the correlation between the pre-crisis levels of fi-
nancial liberalization and output loss associated with the crisis. The first two repre-
sentation of the estimated model uses an OLS specification without interactions,
16WEO database April 2003
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Yit = α0 + βiFLit−1 + γiZit−1 + εit, (1.1)
where Yit is the output loss measured as the cumulative deviation of actual from po-
tential output over the duration of the crisis. FLit−1 is the measure(s) of financial
liberalization in the period prior to the beginning of the crisis. Differences between
the two representations of the model without interactions appear in the financial
liberalization index, FLit−1. The first representation uses the aggregated pre-crisis
index of financial liberalization. The second disaggregates the overall index of finan-
cial liberalization into its seven components. Here, the financial liberalization variable
becomes graded indexes of credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, priva-
tization, international capital controls, security market. Banking supervision appears
through indicator variables for the value of the index. In both specifications, Zit−1
is a vector of covariates that control for the pre-crisis level of the macroeconomic
conditions in each country along with region indicator variables and a variable for to
indicate whether a previous crisis is observed in the country.
As noted by Shehzad and de Haan (2009) and Angkinand et al. (2010), the
banking supervision and regulation policy variable differs in form from the other six
policy variables in that the higher the score, the more regulated the banking sector.
Incorporating this observation and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997)’s finding
that banking crises are more likely to occur in an environment with weak banking
supervision, the second model adds an interaction term between banking supervision
and the other measures of financial liberalization. Here, the model becomes
Yit = α0 + βiFLit−1 + δiBanking Supervisionit−1+
λi (FLit−1 ×Banking Supervisionit−1) + γiZit−1 + εit.
(1.2)
In this specification, Yit remains the measure of output loss, however, the vari-
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able for the financial liberalization index is altered to remove the banking supervision
component. Thus, the index is the summation of the six remaining policy aspects
with a minimum value of zero and maximum of 18. Banking supervision is a graded
index from zero to three. As with the previous model, two representations of the sec-
ond model are estimated. The first uses the overall index of financial liberalization,
and the second representation uses the remaining six individual components of the
overall index. Zit−1 is a vector of covariates that control for the pre-crisis level of the
macroeconomic conditions in each country along with region indicator variables and
a variable for to indicate whether a previous crisis is observed in the country.
1.5.2 Changes in the level of financial liberalization
The second set of models are similar in form to the first set in that the de-
pendent variable is output loss. The difference between the two sets is that in the
second, changes in the level of financial liberalization are observed and included in the
model. Once again, the first two specifications of the model uses an OLS specification
without interaction terms,
Yit = α0 + βiFLit−1 + ηiReformit + γiZit−1 + εit (1.3)
where Yit is the output loss measured as the cumulative deviation of actual from
potential output over the duration of the crisis. Reformit is a vector of indicator
variables that include large reform in 2, reform in 2, reversal in 2, and large rever-
sal in 2. Zit−1 is a vector of covariates that control for the pre-crisis level of the
macroeconomic conditions in each country along with region indicator variables and
a variable for to indicate whether a previous crisis is observed in the country. As with
the previous model, two specifications are estimated: one for the aggregated index of
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financial liberalization, and another with the components individually.
Using the knowledge that banking crisis are more likely to occur after changes
in the level of financial liberalization especially in environments with little banking
supervision, an addition model is presented as
Yit = α0 + βiFLit−1 + δiBanking Supervisionit−1 + ηiReformit+
µi (Reformit ×Banking Supervisionit−1) + γiZit−1 + εit.
(1.4)
Yit remains the measure of output loss. Banking supervisiont−1 is a graded
index from zero to three. As with the previous models, two representations are
estimated. The first uses the overall index of financial liberalization, and the second
representation uses the remaining six individual components of the overall index.
(Reformit ×Banking Supervisionit−1) is the interaction term between the level of
banking sector supervision and the changes in the index of financial liberalization.
Zit−1 is a vector of covariates that control for the pre-crisis level of the macroeconomic
conditions in each country along with region indicator variables and a variable for to
indicate whether a previous crisis is observed in the country.
1.6 Results
For each specification, three separate measures of output loss are utilized as the
dependent variable.17 The first measure is based on the assumption that the pre-crisis
trend that represents the normal growth path of the economy is derived over the five
year period prior to the crisis, [t− 5, t− 1]. The second measure addresses the concern
that a five year window is insufficient to determine the trend for potential output.
Thus, the second measure bases its trend on the 20 years prior to the beginning of an
17Here, only the results pertaining to the censored output loss measures are discussed.
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episode, that is [t− 20, t− 1]. The final measure uses all of the information available
in the data set prior to the crisis to form the pre-crisis trend. This method derives
potential output directly from a linear interpolation of the Hodrick-Prescott smoothed
series, stated as [ImputedHP ]. The discussion on each set of results presented relates
the estimates on the financial liberalization variables to the three measures of output
loss.
The empirical findings of the first model are provided in Table 1.5. For the
columns labeled “Solo”, the coefficient in each row is corresponds to the regression
in which only the financial liberalization variable to the left of it is the independent
variable. For instance, in estimating the model, the coefficient on credit controls is
0.78 when the model estimated is
Yit = α0 + βiCredit Controlsit−1 + γiZit−1 + εit. (1.5)
In this specification, the overall measure of financial liberalization is insignificant
for all output loss calculations. The primary advantage of this measure of financial
liberalization is that it allows for disaggregation into its seven aspects of financial
liberalization. Of the seven components, the indicator variable for the highest ob-
served level of banking supervision, Banking (2), is significant at the one percent
level. Countries with the higher level of banking supervision and prudent regulation
are associated with crises with smaller output losses. For the first output loss mea-
sure, the severity of an episode is approximately a full standard deviation less than
a country who had the lowest level of banking supervision and regulations, that is a
country, such as Argentina in the 1980s, where the index for banking supervision is
equal to zero. For the second output loss measure, [t− 20, t− 1], countries with the
highest level of supervision observed is also associated with less severe output losses
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as the severity of banking crises is 1.13 standard deviations lower. The results for
the third measure, [ImputedHP ], reveal that the highest observed level of banking
supervision is associated with much less severe banking crises. With this measure,
banking crises are 1.48 standard deviations less severe for the countries with more su-
pervision than those with the lowest level of supervision. This accounts for nearly one
and a half standard deviations from a mean of 45.06 percent. While the estimates of
the impact of higher levels of banking supervision on output loss vary greatly among
the different measures of output loss, a common theme is apparent. Having greater
levels of banking supervision is correlated with significantly lower levels of output loss.
Thus, banking supervision matters greatly in questioning the impacts of liberalizing
the financial sector on the severity of banking crises. In the column labeled “all”, all
seven of the financial liberalization policy aspects appear in the regression simultane-
ously, and the results are similar in both sign and magnitude to the set of estimates
where financial liberalization and then each of its components enter singularly.
The second model includes the interaction between the measures of financial
liberalization and the level of banking supervision. The results from this model are
presented in Table 1.6. It is divided into three sets of regressions where the dependent
variable corresponds to the three primary measures of output loss. Examining the first
set of results, three columns are provided. The first column represents the coefficient,
βi , for each of the policy variables on the far left column entered into the regression
independently similar to that labeled “solo” in the previous table. In each of the
estimations, the graded index of banking supervision enters into the regression. The
second column of each set of results provides the coefficient on banking supervision,
δi. The third column reports the coefficient on the interaction, λi , between the
financial sector policy variable and banking supervision. For example, in estimating
the model with the output loss measure formed using the [t− 5, t− 1] period, the
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coefficient on interest rate controls is 1.31, -2.10 for banking supervision, and -0.72
for the interaction term.
For the first output loss measure, the coefficient on banking supervision when
regressing the output loss measure on entry barriers is significantly at the 5% level
and negative indicating that an increase in the level of banking supervision by one
index point is correlated with a less severe banking crisis by 0.52 standard deviations
in countries with higher barriers to entry. Adding a square of banking supervision
reveals that the rate at which banking supervision reduces the severity of a banking
crisis diminishes with higher levels of banking supervision and output loss.
Under the third measure of output loss, the coefficients on many of the finan-
cial policy aspect variables are significant. In countries with less banking supervision
and regulations, the overall level of financial liberalization and several of the individ-
ual aspects are significantly related to more severe crises. An increase in the financial
liberalization index of one index point is correlated with an increase in the measured
output loss of 0.67 percentage points.18 Additionally, credit controls are positively
correlated with output loss as an increase in one index point is associated with an
increase in the severity of the banking crisis by 0.07 percent of one standard deviation.
Repression in the financial sector with high barriers to entry is correlated with an in-
crease of 2.84 percentage points, or 0.05 standard deviations, in the measure of output
loss when the banking sector has low to no supervision. Interestingly, in cases where
barriers to entry are extremely high, an increase in banking supervision by one index
point is correlated with a decrease in severity by 0.06 standard deviations lowering
the average output loss to 41.8 percent. Similar to the results of the first measure
of output loss, the non-linear banking supervision term reveals a diminishing impact
18The overall measure of financial liberalization does not include the index for banking supervision.
It is the aggregation of the remaining six aspects described in the data section of the paper.
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of increasing the level of prudent banking regulation and supervision. Increasing the
level of privatization in the banking sector in an economy with weak supervision is
correlated with more severe banking crises by approximately 0.03 standard deviations.
Similarly countries developing security markets in the absence of banking supervision
are correlated with crises that are more severe by nearly 0.04 standard deviations.
Examining the results of this specification, the primary result of the first model is
strengthened. Here, it is found that liberalizing the financial sector in the presence of
weak banking supervision and regulatory enforcement are associated with increased
output losses.
The third model controls for changes in the overall index of financial liberaliza-
tion when examining the correlation between the aggregated/disaggregated measures
of financial liberalization and measured output losses. The resulting estimates are
similar to those of the first model and are presented in Table 1.7. Again, the table
is divided into three groupings each relating to the three measures of output loss. In
each of the groupings, there are four rows. The coefficient in each row is the coefficient
for the variable in the first column when the header of the column is the independent
financial sector policy aspect. For example, the coefficient for entry barriers when
using the first measure of output loss is -0.41. Thus the first row relates provides the
coefficient for the financial liberalization component, βi. The indicator variable for
banking supervision equal to two, Banking (2), is significant at the one percent level
for all measures of output loss. For the first loss measure, Banking (2) is correlated
with less severe banking crisis of nearly a full standard deviation. For the second mea-
sure, this value increases to 1.12 standard deviations, and increases further to almost
1.5 standard deviations, for the third measure. The additional information gathered
from this specification relates to changes in the overall level of financial liberalization.
As noted, literature has found that banking crises are more likely to occur during the
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years following financial sector liberalization. In fact, in 59 percent of the observed
episodes, a reform or large reform had occurred in the two years prior to the dating
of the banking crisis. The next three rows in the table provide the coefficients on the
reform variables, ηi. For example, the coefficient on reform in 2 in the first row is 0.18
when privatization is the lone policy variable in the regression. For the first output
loss measure, estimates relating a reform or large reform in the previous two years
are insignificant, but the estimates relating reversals in the previous two years to the
measure of output loss are positive and significant. Countries who decreased their
level of financial liberalization in the years prior to the crisis occurring are correlated
with increases in severity of approximately 10 percentage points. One explanation for
such a strong positive correlation between reversals and output loss is that a country
observes problems with their financial sector and tightens controls of the financial
sector, but despite their efforts, the country ends up in a crisis. This could cause
an endogeniety bias, and at this time, a good way of dealing with the bias is not
available. The third output loss measure reveals a similar outcome as the estimates
for a reversal in the previous two years are also significant and positive with values
ranging from 18 to 23 percent of one standard deviation. While estimates for the
second measure of output loss are not significant, the sign of all estimates are positive
and similar in magnitude of the other two measures. With the widespread finding in
the literature that increasing the level of financial liberalization increases the proba-
bility of a banking crisis occurring, it is interesting that none of the coefficients for
“reform in 2” are significant. Thus, it can not be concluded that increasing the level
of financial liberalization has a positive or negative impact on the severity of a crisis.
The fourth model incorporates an interaction term between the index for bank-
ing supervision and the reform variables. Results of this specification are presented
in Table 1.8. Table 1.8 reads similar to Table 1.7. For the third measure of output
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loss, [ImputedHP ], the overall result mirrors those of the previous specifications.
The estimated coefficients for banking supervision are negative in every estimation
and significant in the majority of cases. Increasing the level of banking supervision
and regulation by one index point is estimated to be related to decreased output loss
of 67 to 71 percent of a standard deviation. The estimates for reform, large reform
and reversal paint a similar picture as the results from the third model. For the first
measure of output loss, reform and large reform remains insignificant, but in each set
of regressions, the estimates are positive. Reversals in the two years prior to the crisis
are shown to be positively correlated with output loss with estimated values that
range from 0.82 to one standard deviations, nearly a 0.21 standard deviation increase
from the model without interactions. The estimates for both reform variables remain
positive but insignificant for the second output loss measure, and the only significant
reversal estimate is in the regression where the independent variable is the overall
measure of financial liberalization. Here, the presence of a reversal in the two years
prior to the crisis is associated with an increase in the severity of the crisis by 37.18
percentage points or 1.1 standard deviations. While all of the other coefficients on
reversal are insignificant, the magnitude of the effects are large as they range from
0.66 to 0.86 standard deviations. The “reversal in 2” remains significant and positive
in the set of regressions for the third measure of output loss as the correlation between
the reversal variable and output loss ranges from 0.47 and 0.58 standard deviations.
The interaction terms between the variables for a reform during the two years prior
and index for banking supervision in the period prior to the crisis are negative and
significant in the the regressions were the independent variable is privatization and
security markets. Thus, an increase in the level of banking supervision even in the
absence of a reform is correlated with a decline in output loss of 0.14 standard de-
viations when the independent variable is privatization and when the independent
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variable is the aspect relating to presence of security markets. Again, “Reform in 2”
is not significant in any of the measures of output loss.
1.6.1 Robustness Check
To test the sensitivity of the above results to the specification of the model, two
primary alterations are made. The first addresses the concern that credit booms prior
to the crisis leads to higher than normal levels of investment. With elevated invest-
ment figures, the derived potential output measures will overstate the pre-crisis trend
that the output loss measure is based upon. For this reason, two additional output
loss figures were derived. One bases the pre-crisis trend over the period [t− 6, t− 2],
and the other is calculated over the period [t− 20, t− 2]. In general, the literature on
output losses during financial crises censors the estimates at zero and reports output
losses as positive values. In the second alteration, the data is not censored at zero.
Thus, an output loss is negative while an output gain is positive. Making this change
increases the variability of all measures of output loss and takes into account that
output can rise over the crisis period.
1.6.1.1 Changing Period
Table 1.9 includes the results of the two additional measures of output loss
in addition to the three presented in above for the first model. Again, the indica-
tor variable for banking supervision with a value of two is the only variable that is
significant in this specification. For the measure based on the period [t− 6, t− 2],
the coefficient remains negative and significant, but increases in magnitude indicating
that the highest observed level of banking supervision is correlated with less severe
banking crises with the output loss declining by 1.07 standard deviations. For the
28
measure that uses the period [t− 20, t− 2] to calculate potential output, the results
are similar. They are of the same sign and significance, but are larger by 0.1 standard
deviations. Thus, the removal of the year prior to the banking crisis does not yield
significant differences in the results of the first model.
The estimates for all five output losses are presented in Table 1.10. For the
output loss derived from the period [t− 6, t− 2], the results again are the same as the
[t− 5, t− 1] but are larger in magnitude. The coefficient on banking supervision when
the independent aspect variable is entry barriers is -9.82, an increase of half a standard
deviation. The non-linear term on banking supervision is again negative and of larger
magnitude. For the [t− 20, t− 2] output loss measure, the coefficient on banking
supervision when privatization is the independent aspect variable becomes significant
and remains negative. Thus, an increase in the index of banking supervision by one
index point is correlated with a decrease in output loss by 0.42 standard deviations.
In estimating the third model, the coefficients on both the [t− 6, t− 2] and
[t− 20, t− 2] measure of output loss yield similar conclusions as the [t− 5, t− 1]
and [t− 20, t− 1] measures. Results can be found in Table 1.11 and reveal that
Banking (2) remains significant and negative with each estimate gaining in magnitude.
The largest difference is in the coefficient on the reversal indicator variable. When
moving the window back from [t− 5, t− 1] to [t− 6, t− 2], most of the estimates
become insignificant with only the coefficient when entry barriers is the independent
aspect measure is significant with a value of 12.79, nearly a 2 percentage point, or 0.1
standard deviation increase. However, the estimates are very similar in magnitude
between the two measures, and the associated p-values are close to the 10 percent
cut-off value. A similar analysis can be made for the fourth model as much of the
difference is made in the coefficients on the reversal variable.
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1.6.1.2 Non-censored output loss measures
Non-censored output loss figures take on both negative and positive values.
A positive estimate implies that output is lost over the duration of the crisis while
a negative estimate means that output is gained over the duration. Table 1.12 pro-
vides the results for the first model using the non-censored values as the dependent
variable. For all three of the measures of output loss, [t− 5, t− 1], [t− 20, t− 1],
and [ImputedHP ], the coefficient on Banking (2) is large and negative meaning
that banking supervision with an index of two is correlated negatively with output
losses.19 This result implies that countries with higher levels of banking supervision
have banking crises that are less severe on average. The largest difference between
the censored and non-censored output loss results is that other aspects of financial
liberalization begin to show significance. In the output loss measure derived over the
period [t− 20, t− 1], the coefficient on the overall measure of financial liberalization
is -3.24. Thus, an increase in the financial liberalization index of one index point is
associated with a reduction in severity by 0.08 standard deviations. Entry barriers,
International Capital Restrictions, and Security Markets also become significant with
coefficients of -9.99, -9.75, and -11.45 respectively. Each of the variables are indexes
that range from zero to three; thus, an increase in any of the financial liberalization
aspect variables by one index point lessens the severity of a crisis by 0.25, 0.24, and
0.38 standard deviations respectively.
Table 1.13 provides the estimation results of the second model. For the out-
put loss measure with potential output derived from the period [t− 20, t− 1], the
coefficient on banking supervision when entry barriers is the independent financial
19Output loss figures based upon [t− 6, t− 2] and [t− 20, t− 2] were calculated and used for
the non-censored estimations. Utilizing these two output loss variables did not create significant
differences in the coefficients and significance levels of the variable of interest.
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liberalization variable is positive and becomes significant at the 5% level. The same
is true when the independent financial liberalization variable is privatization. Hence,
increasing banking supervision by one index point while holding the entry barriers
and privatization index values constant is correlated with in a reduction in output
loss by 0.66 standard deviations and 0.48 standard deviations, respectively. In terms
of the output loss based upon the imputation of potential output from the Hodrick-
Prescott smoothed series, the overall index of financial liberalization, privatization
and security markets lose significance. All of the other significant estimates retain
their correlation with output loss.
The third model, which incorporates the changes in financial liberalization,
produces similar results to the estimation with the censored values of output loss.
The results of this model are presented in Table 1.14. For all three output loss
measures, Banking (2) remains significant and correlated with lower output losses.
For the output loss measure based upon the [t− 20, t− 1] period, certain aspects
of financial liberalization are found to be significant and to be correlated with a
reduction in the severity of a banking crisis as well. Besides the overall measure
of financial liberalization, those aspects include entry barriers, international capital
restrictions, and security markets. For the first measure of output loss, [t− 5, t− 1],
only the reversal in the previous two years retains its significance with a value of 10.55.
Thus, for countries who decrease their level of financial liberalization sometime during
the previous two years, it is correlated with an increase in severity of 0.58 standard
deviations. Compared to the estimated coefficient of the censored data, 0.75 standard
deviations, the values differ by 0.17 standard deviations. For the output loss measure
derived directly from the smoothed HPrescott series, all coefficients on reversal in two
remain significant and the direction of correlation with the exception of the regression
in which the independent financial liberalization aspect is entry barriers.
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Table 1.15 reports the estimates of the fourth model with the non-censored
calculated output losses. For the output loss derived from the pre-crisis period
[t− 20, t− 1], the coefficient on the overall level of financial liberalization and en-
try barriers becomes significant. A one index point increase in the overall financial
liberalization index correlates to a 0.08 standard deviation reduction in the severity
of a crisis. Where as a one index point increase in the measure of entry barriers is
correlates to a 0.28 standard deviation decline in the loss of output. When the results
of the regression using the output loss measure derived directly from the HPrescott
smoothed series, all coefficient estimates for banking supervision are significant and
exhibit the same magnitude and direction of correlation as the censored results fur-
ther strengthening the importance of banking supervision. Reversal in two remains
significant and negative in the estimation showing that reversals in the degree of fi-
nancial liberalization is correlated with greater losses. A stark difference between the
censored and non-censored measures of financial liberalization is the emergence of
significance for the interaction between reform and banking supervision. In the esti-
mations based upon the output losses based on [t− 5, t− 1] and [ImputedHP ], the
interaction between reform and banking supervision is positive meaning that increas-
ing the index value of banking supervision (adding additional banking supervision
and regulations) while holding the overall level of financial liberalization constant is
correlated with a reduction in the severity of the banking crises. For the [t− 5, t− 1]
output loss measure, the values range from 0.64 to 0.68 standard deviations, and
the range is between 0.17 and 0.19 standard deviations for the output loss measure
imputed directly from the HPrescott series.
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1.7 Conclusions
Research on financial liberalization finds that it leads to faster growth in the
long run but more crises in the short-run. Schmukler and Kaminsky (2003) reveals
that financial liberalization is followed by more pronounced boom-bust cycles stock
market cycles in the short run, but in the long run, liberalization leads to more stable
financial markets. Ranciere et al. (2006) find that after decomposing the effects of
financial liberalization, the positive direct effect that it has on growth is greater than
the negative indirect effect of the increased likelihood of a banking crisis occurring.
Realizing that financial liberalization is good for an economy in the long-run, this
project provides a detailed analysis of whether the liberalization of the financial sector
dampens or exacerbates banking crises.
Using the aggregate measure of financial liberalization and its seven com-
ponents, the correlation between financial sector liberalization and the severity of
systemic banking crises is analyzed. The primary finding is that banking supervision
and prudent regulation plays an important role in the liberalization of the financial
sector with the more highly regulated economies suffering less from a loss in output.
One possible explanation for this correlation is that adequate banking supervision
and regulation is needed to control for the inherent increase in moral hazard from
the liberalization of the financial sector as bank managers are less likely to act in a
manner that pushes their banks into insolvency. Interestingly, the measure of output
loss does not tend to matter in determining the importance of banking supervision
as the different methods of calculating potential output are consistent on this mat-
ter. The greatest difference in the coefficients from the different measures lies in the
magnitude of those estimates. When using the non-censored measures of output loss,
banking supervision shows to be important in its interaction with the “reform in two”
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variable. Here, increasing the level of banking supervision while holding the overall
level of financial liberalization constant is correlated with a lower output loss.
There is weak evidence that liberalization in the financial sector in terms of
credit controls, entry barriers, privatization, and security market development are
correlated with greater output losses. Additionally, countries that reverse their level
of financial liberalization in the years prior to the beginning of the crisis tend to suffer
greater. No evidence is found to show that a correlation exists between reforms and
output loss or large reforms and output loss even though a reform or large reform
preceded a large fraction of the observed crises.
Given recent global macroeconomic events, interest in financial crises has
reemerged. The quantity and frequency of articles in scholarly journals has increased,
and books published about the causes and consequences banking crises such as Rein-
hardt and Rogoff’s This Time is Different or Rajan’s Fault Lines find their way into
the popular media. Both the public and policy makers want to know what caused
the dominoes to fall on this and past banking crises, and if the economy falls into
a banking crisis, how severe will the crises be? Here, it is recognized that financial
liberalization is a vital part of the growth process as it leads to more stable financial
markets and faster growth in the future. Thus, the increased risk of banking crises
is a necessary evil along the path of higher growth rates. From studies such as this,
policymakers can see the aspects of the financial system that can be liberated, and
how liberating certain areas can make crises more or less severe if they occur. For a
problem that is largely the result of asymmetric information, theory has predicted and
this paper has shown that any liberalization of the financial sector without proper
banking supervision can lead to banking crises that are far worse than those with
more supervision. Governments can surmise that unbridled liberalization can make
the short-run pain greater.
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Appendices
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Appendix A Components of the Financial Liber-
alization Measure
The measure of financial liberalization is constructed of seven financial sector
policy aspects. Each of the policy aspects receive a graded score from zero to three.
The scores are then added to reach an overall score between zero and 21 with the
higher the score representing the higher the level of financial liberalization. As in
Abiad et al. (2008), each of the seven financial sector policy aspects are described
below.
• Credit Controls: How restrictive are the reserve requirements? Countries
with higher reserve requirements are considered to be more financially repressed.
Are there minimum amounts of credit that must directed to certain sectors of
the economy? Is credit supplied to certain sector subsidized?
• Interest Rate Controls: Are interest rates subject to a binding ceiling, or are
they fully determined in the market. The more financially liberalized systems
will allow for interest rates to be determined in the financial markets.
• Entry Barriers to the Banking Sector: Questions if foreign banks are
allowed to enter the industry, if the government allows new domestic banks,
are there restrictions on branching, and in which activities will the government
allow the banks to engage.
• Banking Supervision and Prudent Regulation: In determining the score
for this aspect, ? ask the following questions: Is the banking supervisory agency
independent from executive’s influence? Has the country adopted a capital
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adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard? Does the supervisory agency
conduct the supervision through on- and off-site evaluations? Are all financial
institutions subject to the supervisory agency?
• Privatization: The score for this category depends on the percentage of state
owned banks.
• International Capital Restrictions: Is there a special exchange rate for
capital or current account transactions? Are there any restrictions on capital
outflows? Are there any restrictions on capital outflows?
• Security Markets: Does the economy have securities markets? How advanced
are those markets, and is their equity market open to foreign investors?
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1.2 Figures
Figure 1.1: LN Per Capita Real GDP and Hodrick-Prescott Smoothed LN Per Capita Real
GDP, Finland: 1973 - 2005.
38
Figure 1.2: The calculations of the pre-crisis trends based upon the three primary assump-
tions concerning the window over which the trend is developed, Finland: 1973 - 2005.
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1.3 Tables
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Table 1.1: List of Countries and Dates of Systemic Banking
Crises
Start End Start End
Country Year Year Duration Country Year Year Duration
Algeria 1990 1994 5 Madagascar 1988 1988 1
Argentina 1980 1982 3 Malaysia 1997 1999 3
Argentina 1989 1991 3 Mexico 1981 1985 5
Argentina 1995 1995 1 Mexico 1994 1996 3
Argentina 2001 2003 3 Morocco 1980 1984 5
Bangladesh 1987 1987 1 Mozambique 1987 1991 5
Bolivia 1986 1986 1 Nepal 1988 1988 1
Bolivia 1994 1994 1 Nicaragua 1990 1993 4
Brazil 1990 1994 5 Nicaragua 2000 2001 2
Brazil 1994 1998 5 Nigeria 1991 1995 5
Bulgaria 1996 1997 2 Norway 1991 1993 3
Cameroon 1987 1991 5 Paraguay 1995 1995 1
Cameroon 1995 1997 3 Peru 1983 1983 1
Chile 1976 1976 1 Philippines 1983 1986 4
Chile 1981 1985 5 Philippines 1997 2001 5
China 1998 1998 1 Poland 1992 1994 3
Colombia 1982 1982 1 Senegal 1988 1991 4
Colombia 1998 2000 3 Spain 1977 1981 5
Costa Rica 1987 1991 5 Sri Lanka 1989 1991 3
Costa Rica 1994 1995 2 Sweden 1991 1995 5
Ecuador 1982 1986 5 Tanzania 1987 1988 2
Ecuador 1998 2002 5 Thailand 1983 1983 1
Egypt 1980 1980 1 Thailand 1997 2000 4
El Salvador 1989 1990 2 Tunisia 1991 1991 1
Finland 1991 1995 5 Turkey 1982 1984 3
Ghana 1982 1983 2 Turkey 2000 2001 2
India 1993 1993 1 Uganda 1994 1994 1
Indonesia 1997 2001 5 Ukraine 1998 1999 2
Israel 1977 1977 1 United States 1988 1988 1
Jamaica 1996 1998 3 Uruguay 1981 1985 5
Japan 1997 2001 5 Uruguay 2002 2005 4
Jordan 1989 1991 3 Venezuela 1994 1998 5
Kenya 1985 1985 1 Vietnam 1997 1997 1
Kenya 1992 1994 3 Zimbabwe 1995 1999 5
Korea 1997 1998 2
a Identification and dates determined by Laeven and Valencia (2010).
b Crises with duration longer than five years are truncated at 5 years.
41
Table 1.2: Measured Output Loss Estimates
Beginning Ending Output Loss
Country Year Year [t-5,t-1] [t-20,t-1] Imputed
Algeria 1990 1994 13.86 82.43 99.42
Argentina 1980 1982 5.52 32.68 38.22
Argentina 1989 1991 17.16 31.60 68.28
Argentina 1995 1995 0.00 0.00 0.20
Argentina 2001 2003 25.42 10.74 24.96
Bangladesh 1987 1987 0.64 0.00 0.00
Bolivia 1986 1986 6.92 16.58 21.51
Bolivia 1994 1994 0.00 0.00 0.50
Brazil 1990 1994 11.94 100.41 195.85
Brazil 1994 1998 0.00 15.57 160.90
Bulgaria 1996 1997 10.16 43.05 69.38
Cameroon 1987 1991 57.84 132.53 109.71
Cameroon 1995 1997 0.75 77.66 121.70
Chile 1976 1976 12.89 20.64 21.12
Chile 1981 1985 1.91 14.96 42.61
China 1998 1998 0.05 0.00 0.00
Colombia 1982 1982 0.00 1.68 0.76
Colombia 1998 2000 0.00 0.00 0.00
Costa Rica 1987 1991 0.00 58.16 103.53
Costa Rica 1994 1995 0.00 0.00 7.07
Ecuador 1982 1986 48.25 93.60 75.92
Ecuador 1998 2002 5.43 0.00 131.91
Egypt 1980 1980 2.17 0.00 0.00
El Salvador 1989 1990 0.67 4.00 26.83
Finland 1991 1995 34.62 80.12 139.09
Ghana 1982 1983 4.32 37.62 42.94
India 1993 1993 3.03 1.70 0.00
Indonesia 1997 2001 43.12 68.48 101.03
Israel 1977 1977 6.25 13.54 17.06
Jamaica 1996 1998 0.86 0.00 0.00
Japan 1997 2001 15.48 52.54 188.70
Jordan 1989 1991 37.67 95.69 97.89
Kenya 1985 1985 7.15 6.88 8.05
Kenya 1992 1994 9.41 6.64 10.01
Korea 1997 1998 9.97 16.52 0.00
1
a All values are in percentages.
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Table 1.2: Measured Output Loss Estimates
(continued)
Beginning Ending Output Loss
Country Year Year [t-5,t-1] [t-20,t-1] Imputed
Madagascar 1988 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 1997 1999 7.26 0.00 9.75
Mexico 1981 1985 12.95 35.89 33.05
Mexico 1994 1996 3.54 12.43 63.03
Morocco 1980 1984 32.45 80.19 109.00
Mozambique 1987 1991 0.00 14.97 47.16
Nepal 1988 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nicaragua 1990 1993 26.20 93.33 216.38
Nicaragua 2000 2001 0.00 0.00 13.46
Nigeria 1991 1995 0.00 0.00 71.50
Norway 1991 1993 6.17 16.07 26.77
Paraguay 1995 1995 0.19 11.58 18.99
Peru 1983 1983 9.55 20.72 28.31
Philippines 1983 1986 25.05 57.40 66.09
Philippines 1997 2001 0.00 0.00 40.60
Poland 1992 1994 7.79 18.72 28.11
Senegal 1988 1991 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 1977 1981 26.77 103.68 120.99
Sri Lanka 1989 1991 6.92 10.80 10.68
Sweden 1991 1995 13.66 24.61 73.47
Tanzania 1987 1988 0.00 3.09 16.03
Thailand 1983 1983 3.02 3.58 5.43
Thailand 1997 2000 41.17 65.57 55.15
Tunisia 1991 1991 0.00 4.20 11.17
Turkey 1982 1984 7.16 25.12 25.53
Turkey 2000 2001 6.72 6.77 13.80
Uganda 1994 1994 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 1998 1999 13.78 13.78 0.00
United States 1988 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uruguay 1981 1985 40.36 19.40 7.38
Uruguay 2002 2005 36.28 59.37 24.03
Venezuela 1994 1998 0.00 0.00 48.41
Vietnam 1997 1997 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 1995 1999 0.00 0.00 0.00
a All values are in percentages.
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Table 1.3: Complete Set - Measured Output Loss Estimates
Beginning Ending Output Loss
Country Year Year [t-5,t-1] [t-6,t-2] [t-20,t-1] [t-20,t-2] Imputed
Algeria 1990 1994 13.86 22.10 82.43 93.04 99.42
Argentina 1980 1982 5.52 10.31 32.68 37.29 38.22
Argentina 1989 1991 17.16 13.42 31.60 34.30 68.28
Argentina 1995 1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
Argentina 2001 2003 25.42 27.76 10.74 7.83 24.96
Bangladesh 1987 1987 0.64 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bolivia 1986 1986 6.92 7.01 16.58 18.41 21.51
Bolivia 1994 1994 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Brazil 1990 1994 11.94 14.21 100.41 115.32 195.85
Brazil 1994 1998 0.00 0.00 15.57 21.70 160.90
Bulgaria 1996 1997 10.16 9.47 43.05 49.08 69.38
Cameroon 1987 1991 57.84 87.71 132.53 142.93 109.71
Cameroon 1995 1997 0.75 0.00 77.66 91.25 121.70
Chile 1976 1976 12.89 13.37 20.64 22.13 21.12
Chile 1981 1985 1.91 0.00 14.96 17.91 42.61
China 1998 1998 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Colombia 1982 1982 0.00 0.54 1.68 2.09 0.76
Colombia 1998 2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Costa Rica 1987 1991 0.00 0.00 58.16 69.45 103.53
Costa Rica 1994 1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.07
Ecuador 1982 1986 48.25 71.84 93.60 99.24 75.92
Ecuador 1998 2002 5.43 4.12 0.00 0.00 131.91
Egypt 1980 1980 2.17 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
El Salvador 1989 1990 0.67 0.00 4.00 4.79 26.83
Finland 1991 1995 34.62 43.04 80.12 87.15 139.09
Ghana 1982 1983 4.32 4.41 37.62 43.72 42.94
India 1993 1993 3.03 3.16 1.70 1.43 0.00
Indonesia 1997 2001 43.12 57.96 68.48 72.16 101.03
Israel 1977 1977 6.25 8.52 13.54 14.98 17.06
Jamaica 1996 1998 0.86 3.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
Japan 1997 2001 15.48 22.89 52.54 57.92 188.70
Jordan 1989 1991 37.67 46.52 95.69 105.01 97.89
Kenya 1985 1985 7.15 7.08 6.88 6.80 8.05
Kenya 1992 1994 9.41 11.17 6.64 6.22 10.01
Korea 1997 1998 9.97 13.41 16.52 17.62 0.00
a All values are in percentages.
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Table 1.3: Measured Output Loss Estimates (continued)
Beginning Ending Output Loss
Country Year Year [t-5,t-1] [t-6,t-2] [t-20,t-1] [t-20,t-2] Imputed
Madagascar 1988 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 1997 1999 7.26 11.58 0.00 0.00 9.75
Mexico 1981 1985 12.95 22.23 35.89 39.40 33.05
Mexico 1994 1996 3.54 0.94 12.43 14.38 63.03
Morocco 1980 1984 32.45 44.91 80.19 88.01 109.00
Mozambique 1987 1991 0.00 0.00 14.97 25.11 47.16
Nepal 1988 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nicaragua 1990 1993 26.20 35.42 93.33 104.21 216.38
Nicaragua 2000 2001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.46
Nigeria 1991 1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 71.50
Norway 1991 1993 6.17 6.15 16.07 17.79 26.77
Paraguay 1995 1995 0.19 0.63 11.58 13.86 18.99
Peru 1983 1983 9.55 10.62 20.72 22.94 28.31
Philippines 1983 1986 25.05 35.50 57.40 62.31 66.09
Philippines 1997 2001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.60
Poland 1992 1994 7.79 4.72 18.72 20.86 28.11
Senegal 1988 1991 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 1977 1981 26.77 41.01 103.68 115.57 120.99
Sri Lanka 1989 1991 6.92 8.08 10.80 11.35 10.68
Sweden 1991 1995 13.66 17.70 24.61 26.34 73.47
Tanzania 1987 1988 0.00 0.00 3.09 4.36 16.03
Thailand 1983 1983 3.02 2.95 3.58 3.68 5.43
Thailand 1997 2000 41.17 55.97 65.57 69.02 55.15
Tunisia 1991 1991 0.00 0.00 4.20 5.10 11.17
Turkey 1982 1984 7.16 9.17 25.12 28.07 25.53
Turkey 2000 2001 6.72 7.14 6.77 6.76 13.80
Uganda 1994 1994 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 1998 1999 13.78 10.74 13.78 10.74 0.00
United States 1988 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uruguay 1981 1985 40.36 50.26 19.40 15.67 7.38
Uruguay 2002 2005 36.28 41.63 59.37 62.38 24.03
Venezuela 1994 1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.41
Vietnam 1997 1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 1995 1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a All values are in percentages.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Financial Reform Index 69 8.45 5.30 0 18
Credit Controls 69 1.24 0.92 0 3
Interest Rate Controls 69 1.78 1.24 0 3
Entry Barriers 69 1.55 1.09 0 3
Banking Supervision 69 0.32 0.56 0 2
Privatization 69 0.99 1.05 0 3
Int’l Capital Restrictions 69 1.43 1.17 0 3
Security Markets 69 1.14 0.97 0 3
Banking0 69 0.73 0.45 0 1
Banking1 69 0.23 0.43 0 1
Banking2 69 0.04 0.21 0 1
Reform in Two 69 0.43 0.50 0 1
Large Reform in Two 69 0.16 0.37 0 1
Reversal in Two 69 0.06 0.234 0 1
Status Quo in Two 69 0.35 0.48 0 1
Output Loss [t-5,t-1] 69 10.44 14.10 0 57.84
Output Loss [t-6,t-2] 69 13.36 19.57 0 87.71
Output Loss [t-20,t-1] 69 26.34 33.61 0 132.53
Output Loss [t-20,t-2] 69 29.10 37.14 0 142.93
Output Loss [Imputed HP] 69 45.06 53.46 0 216.38
Non-Censored Output Loss [t-5,t-1] 69 7.23 18.30 57.84 47.66
Non-Censored Output Loss [t-6,t-2] 69 9.18 24.52 87.71 54.55
Non-Censored Output Loss [t-20,t-1] 69 20.16 40.66 132.53 62.06
Non-Censored Output Loss [t-20,t-2] 69 22.21 44.99 142.93 68.91
Non-Censored Output Loss [Imputed HP] 69 42.29 56.37 216.38 48.57
Per Capita Real GDP (Log) 69 8.27 1.09 5.42 10.38
Growth Rate Output 69 1.78 5.32 -15.32 21.02
Current Account/Output (CA/Y) 69 -104.47 12.30 -139.05 -71.34
% ∆ CA/Y 69 -0.50 3.55 -15.70 7.97
Inflation 69 317.07 1530.99 -4.10 11749.60
% ∆Exchange Rate 69 226.86 837.98 -18.04 4736.73
Previous Crisis 69 0.25 0.43 0 1
a All variables are pre-crisis values.
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Table 1.5: Model 1: Dependent Variable - Output Loss (Censored)
OL [t-5,t-1] OL [t-20,t-1] OL [Imputed HP]
Solo All Solo All Solo All
Financial Liberalization (Overall) 0.15 -1.47 -1.32
(0.76) (0.27) (0.41)
Credit Controls 0.78 0.50 -5.33 -0.48 -4.00 0.48
(0.78) (0.89) (0.37) (0.94) (0.67) (0.96)
Interest Rate Controls 1.10 0.10 -3.32 -2.52 -5.60 -8.95
(0.63) (0.97) (0.54) (0.66) (0.38) (0.28)
Entry Barriers 0.53 -0.96 -5.34 -5.58 0.47 -0.24
(0.81) (0.72) (0.36) (0.38) (0.95) (0.98)
Banking (1) 0.07 -0.40 -4.76 1.71 -16.00 -19.34
(0.99) (0.93) (0.66) (0.88) (0.29) (0.22)
Banking (2) -14.40*** -16.51*** -38.03*** -41.12*** -78.92** -85.76***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Privatization -0.08 -0.91 -1.19 0.32 -0.46 -0.20
(0.96) (0.61) (0.74) (0.93) (0.93) (0.97)
Int’l Capital Restrictions 0.94 1.11 -2.63 3.08 -7.51 -5.77
(0.53) (0.70) (0.52) (0.55) (0.26) (0.45)
Security Markets 0.90 1.29 -6.71 -3.83 1.06 12.23
(0.64) (0.55) (0.22) (0.44) (0.89) (0.19)
a p-varles are provided in parentheses.
b Cluster-robust standard errors calculated.
c * p ¡ 10 percent, ** p ¡ 5 percent, *** p ¡ 1 percent.
d Dependent variable is valued as a percent.
e Macro/Region controls are not reported.
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Table 1.11: Model 3 - Dependent Variable - Output Loss (Censored) - Full Set
Financial Interest
Liberalization Credit Rate Entry Banking Supervision Capital Security
Index Controls Controls Barriers Banking(1) Banking(2) Privitization Restrictions Markets
OL [t-5,t-1]
FLit−1 -0.09 -0.06 0.47 -0.41 -1.50 -13.81*** -0.16 0.40 -0.17
(0.87) (0.98) (0.84) (0.86) (0.70) (0.00) (0.92) (0.80) (0.93)
Reform in 2 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.14
(0.97) (0.98) (0.99) (0.97) (0.98) (0.97) (0.99) (0.98)
Large Reform in 2 4.04 3.72 3.09 3.86 3.66 3.76 3.46 3.81
(0.54) (0.58) (0.65) (0.55) (0.59) (0.58) (0.61) (0.57)
Reversal in 2 10.65* 10.32* 10.14* 10.83* 9.84* 10.29* 10.04* 10.48*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
OL [t-6,t-2]
FLit−1 -0.26 -1.09 0.00 -1.38 -1.03 -20.30*** -0.35 0.74 -0.71
(0.72) (0.78) (1.00) (0.68) (0.85) (0.00) (0.88) (0.73) (0.81)
Reform in 2 0.66 0.48 0.51 0.58 0.44 0.59 0.41 0.49
(0.92) (0.94) (0.94) (0.93) (0.95) (0.93) (0.95) (0.94)
Large Reform in 2 4.87 4.33 3.81 4.39 3.51 3.97 3.39 4.31
(0.58) (0.63) (0.68) (0.62) (0.70) (0.66) (0.71) (0.63)
Reversal in 2 12.06 11.58 10.98 12.79* 9.85 10.98 10.50 11.73
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.21) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
OL [t-20,t-1]
Financial Liberalization -1.86 -6.29 -4.60 -6.49 -5.48 -37.79** -1.23 -3.07 -8.52
(0.18) (0.32) (0.41) (0.28) (0.63) (0.01) (0.74) (0.46) (0.15)
Reform in 2 -0.80 -2.05 -1.02 -1.55 -1.80 -1.60 -1.43 -2.14
(0.94) (0.85) (0.92) (0.88) (0.87) (0.88) (0.89) (0.83)
Large Reform in 2 9.29 4.74 7.62 4.46 2.02 2.31 3.56 7.67
(0.50) (0.73) (0.58) (0.73) (0.89) (0.86) (0.80) (0.57)
Reversal in 2 11.60 7.37 5.44 12.40 3.26 3.92 5.91 12.82
(0.44) (0.64) (0.73) (0.42) (0.84) (0.81) (0.71) (0.41)
OL [t-20,t-2]
Financial Liberalization -2.21 -7.57 -5.64 -7.63 -6.43 -41.32** -1.53 -3.91 -9.94
(0.15) (0.27) (0.36) (0.25) (0.61) (0.01) (0.70) (0.40) (0.12)
Reform in 2 -1.60 -3.10 -1.83 -2.51 -2.78 -2.55 -2.32 -3.20
(0.88) (0.79) (0.87) (0.82) (0.82) (0.83) (0.84) (0.77)
Large Reform in 2 10.27 4.91 8.50 4.50 1.71 2.01 3.62 8.22
(0.50) (0.75) (0.57) (0.76) (0.91) (0.89) (0.81) (0.58)
Reversal in 2 11.61 6.63 4.34 12.46 1.94 2.48 5.01 12.86
(0.49) (0.71) (0.81) (0.47) (0.91) (0.89) (0.78) (0.45)
OL [Imputed HP]
Financial Liberalization 0.32 2.96** 1.37 2.20** -1.75 -2.94 0.25 -0.24 0.58
(0.23) (0.05) (0.28) (0.02) (0.47) (0.37) (0.76) (0.81) (0.61)
Reform in 2 -0.33 -0.38 -0.73 -0.58 -0.39 -0.53 -0.44 -0.45
(0.89) (0.86) (0.78) (0.81) (0.88) (0.83) (0.86) (0.85)
Large Reform in 2 0.27 0.51 0.16 0.99 2.23 1.79 2.04 1.50
(0.94) (0.88) (0.97) (0.74) (0.49) (0.61) (0.54) (0.66)
Reversal in 2 9.81* 10.19** 11.36** 8.94* 12.31** 11.81** 11.97** 11.21**
(0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
a p-varles are provided in parentheses.
b Cluster-robust standard errors calculated.
c * p ¡ 10 percent, ** p ¡ 5 percent, *** p ¡ 1 percent.
d Dependent variable is valued as a percent.
e Macro/Region controls are not reported.
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Table 1.12: Model 1 - Financial Liberalization Variables - Non-censored Output Loss
OL [t-5,t-1] OL [t-20,t-1] OL [Imputed HP]
Solo All Solo All Solo All
Financial Reform -0.12 -3.24** -1.66
(0.85) (0.03) (0.32)
Credit Controls 0.64 1.03 -8.72 1.22 -4.54 1.19
(0.83) (0.79) (0.18) (0.88) (0.63) (0.90)
Interest Rate Controls 1.29 1.00 -7.43 -3.80 -6.90 -10.82
(0.61) (0.74) (0.24) (0.59) (0.32) (0.21)
Entry Barriers -0.12 -0.90 -9.99* -6.76 -0.89 -1.90
(0.96) (0.79) (0.10) (0.30) (0.91) (0.81)
Banking (1) -2.59 -1.58 -19.63 -7.68 -21.54 -25.19
(0.62) (0.80) (0.17) (0.60) (0.18) (0.13)
Banking (2) -16.19*** -17.68** -42.76** -45.68*** -87.68*** -97.37***
0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.00 0.00
Privatization -1.61 -2.14 -6.64 -2.63 -0.70 0.05
(0.45) (0.34) (0.19) (0.59) (0.90) (0.99)
Int’l Capital Restrictions 0.33 1.04 -9.75* -2.28 -8.77 -6.37
(0.87) (0.73) (0.05) (0.71) (0.21) (0.40)
Security Markets -0.50 0.06 -11.45* -2.22 1.14 15.09
(0.85) (0.99) (0.08) (0.70) (0.88) (0.12)
a p-varles are provided in parentheses.
b Cluster-robust standard errors calculated.
c * p ¡ 10 percent, ** p ¡ 5 percent, *** p ¡ 1 percent.
d Dependent variable is valued as a percent.
e Macro/Region controls are not reported.
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